Bad blood: 15 years on by Fonagy, P & Campbell, C
Bad Blood: 15 Years On 
Peter Fonagy 
Chloe Campbell 
University College London 
Author Note 
Peter Fonagy, Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, 
University College London; Chloe Campbell, Research Department of Clinical, Educational 
and Health Psychology, University College London 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter Fonagy, Research 
Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London, 1–
19 Torrington Place, London WV1E 7HB, UK. 
E-mail: p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk 
 
What used to be a major controversy between psychoanalysis and empiricism has 
become tempered, the battle is over and the argument has been won. By both sides. Or 
perhaps it would be more realistic to say it has become more polarized. On the one hand, a 
non-empirical approach has developed into a more extreme philosophical position, as 
expressed by Irwin Hoffman  
‘the privileged status that this movement [empiricism] accords systematic research 
and neuroscience as compared with in-depth case studies and strictly psychological 
accounts of the psychoanalytic process is unwarranted epistemologically and 
potentially damaging both to the development of our understanding of the analytic 
process itself and to the quality of our clinical work.’(Hoffman, 2009/’ p.1044) 
Meanwhile, mainstream psychoanalysis has learnt to live with empiricism and long-term 
psychotherapy as opposed to four times weekly psychoanalysis; long-term treatment is now 
often no more than two years. Psychoanalysis often takes place once or twice a week. But 
epistemologically, there is no conflict anymore. Theoretically, psychoanalysis has won: 
attachment theorists have conceded that attachment is but one of a number of drives (not that 
Bowlby ever thought it was the only one) and there are other routes to reward other than from 
attachment (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2015). 
Thus peace has not altogether broken out. A new battle now lies in convincing 
neuroscientists and CBT therapists that relationships matter. To take one example, those 
working in the field of BPD require no convincing that emotion dysregulation is a key part of 
the clinical problem that individuals with this diagnosis present. Both behavioural (Linehan, 
1993) and neuroscientific (Silk, 2010) (Siever & Weinstein, 2009) theorists can construct 
compelling stories that explain other clinical features of the disorder in terms of such person-
based deficit. Perhaps unintentionally, but nevertheless pervasively, these models obscure the 
importance of interpersonal relationships as drivers of clinical phenomenology. Again, 
clinicians will need no persuading that relationship problems are ubiquitous in BPD. 
However, there is a critical step that is consistently overlooked: these relationship problems 
are reduced to the difficulty an individual (implicitly assumed to be the innocent party) might 
have in dealing with someone who is prone to unpredictable mood fluctuations. The 
relational problem is placed squarely at the foot of the patient with the diagnosis. The therapy 
is also individually focussed on assisting the patient in gaining control over their emotional 
states, whether by increasing their cognitive competences or with the aid of 
psychopharmacology (less likely). What is missing from these approaches is a perspective 
that speaks to patient within their social system and their capacity to learn from, adapt to and 
benefit from their environment. The persistent social dysfunction of an individual with BPD, 
or indeed other forms of personality disorder, emerges from difficulties in social 
communication that reverberate through, echo and often become exaggerated through the 
patient’s social environment. A model for treatment is needed that considers the individual as 
the communicator and recipient of distorted social communication. 
Any psychodynamic formulation, be that a Kleinian model of projective 
identification, a Sullivanian interpersonalist model, or even more strikingly, a relational 
model, or even a self psychology model would see the emotional outburst in the context of 
transference or countertransference processes where the patient’s problems are seen as deeply 
nested in introjection and projection, just like the proverbial Winnicottian baby, never alone. 
Attachment theory occupies the same space. Bowlby’s internal working model is inherently 
interpersonal, not just historically but cross-sectionally, with the individual seeking to 
rediscover familiar patterns of interaction in the current interpersonal exchange. The 
emphasis in dynamic theories nowadays and probably for the last two or three decades has 
been on the creation of the intrapsychic in the theatre of the interpersonal and to this end 
there is no distinction between attachment and the psychoanalytic approach but a deep chasm 
between those who see a sequential rather than a parallel process between the intrapsychic 
and interpersonal. To state it in a somewhat abstract form, the opposition is between a model 
where individual characteristics impact on social interaction (sequential) versus one where 
the intrapsychic becomes manifest within the interpersonal (parallel). Psychoanalysis and 
attachment theorists stand shoulder to shoulder in opposing the reductionism that is implied 
in the serial model of at least severe psychopathology.  
Conflict between psychoanalysis and attachment, however, does remain in the arena 
of the model for clinical intervention. Classical psychoanalysis proposed an insight-oriented 
therapeutic approach which brooked no compromise. The experience of insight, placing ego 
where id had been, was the royal road to cure. Of course this model could have no theoretical 
or empirical validity, as became obvious when psychoanalytic theories multiplied and the 
content of insight, supposedly curative, became diverse to the point of irreducibility. Further, 
as Grünbaum classically pointed out, cure could and mostly did happen without insight 
(Grünbaum, 1984). Attachment theory, meanwhile, had no theory of change: to this extent, at 
least, it was not embarrassed by psychoanalysis’ evident epistemological failure. To the 
extent that Bowlby had suggested a model, this was in the sphere of Alexander and French’s 
idealised notions of restorative emotional experiences in the context of therapy (Alexander & 
French, 1946).  
Neither model is tenable, and most now agree that change occurs in the context of a 
relationship. Within our own model, which is based on a combination of psychoanalytic and 
attachment theory ideas, it is absorbing information from those around one that may be 
critical to modifying one’s own actions, and this is what changes as a consequence of therapy 
(Fonagy et al., 2015). The advantage of a generalised theory of psychotherapy such as the 
epistemic trust model is that it can incorporate cognitive behavioural as well as 
psychodynamic understandings. There has never been good evidence to support the 
hypothesised links between changes in specific cognitive structures assumed to underpin 
progress in CBT and behavioural change. If we assume that change occurs in the extent of 
openness to information from the patient’s relational network, the precise combination of 
mechanisms that may set such changes going is irrelevant. Looking in psychotherapy 
transcripts for predictors of change may simply be the wrong data source. It is the nature of 
the relationship that the patient has with people outside the consulting room, in his or her 
relationships, that propels forward the therapeutic process. This insight is perhaps more 
closely linked to attachment theory than to classical psychoanalysis, but probably sits 
uncomfortably with either orientation as both regard the person of the therapist as the key 
agent of change.  
 The issue now is no longer about the role of empiricism, it is about thinking about 
psychopathology in a way that truly accommodates the fundamental social nature of the 
human psyche – in health or ill-health. Modern western culture in general, and the 
professions of academia and psychoanalysis in particular, are highly individualistic; our 
approach to mental health treatment has been commensurately so. But considering the mind 
in isolation, or in seclusion with another, fails to capture the social imperatives that underpin 
the complexity – and the vulnerability – of the human psyche.  Understanding the 
fundamentally social and cultural processes that surround a mind in distress will, I suggest, be 
vital in going forward to think meaningfully about how we conceptualise psychopathology, 
and what makes treatment effective.  
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